Effective Justice by Crisp, Roger & Pummer, Theron
<UN>
journal of moral philosophy 17 (2020) 398-415
brill.com/jmp
JOURNAL OF
MORAL
PHILOSOPHY
© Roger Crisp and Theron Pummer, 2020 | doi:10.1163/17455243-20193133
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the cc by 4.0 license.
Effective Justice
Roger Crisp
St Anne’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
roger.crisp@st-annes.ox.ac.uk
Theron Pummer
Department of Philosophy, University of St Andrews, St Andrews,  
United Kingdom
tgp4@st-andrews.ac.uk
Abstract
Effective Altruism is a social movement which encourages people to do as much good 
as they can when helping others, given limited money, time, effort, and other resourc-
es. This paper first identifies a minimal philosophical view that underpins this move-
ment, and then argues that there is an analogous minimal philosophical view which 
might underpin Effective Justice, a possible social movement that would encourage 
promoting justice most effectively, given limited resources. The latter minimal view re-
flects an insight about justice, and our non-diminishing moral reason to promote more 
of it, that surprisingly has gone largely unnoticed and undiscussed. The Effective Altru-
ism movement has led many to reconsider how best to help others, but relatively little 
attention has been paid to the differences in degrees of cost-effectiveness of activities 
designed to decrease injustice. This paper therefore not only furthers philosophical 
understanding of justice, but has potentially major practical implications.
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1 Introduction
Effective Altruism is a social movement which encourages people to do as much 
good as they can when helping others, for example when giving to charity.1 The 
movement was spurred by an appreciation of the substantial differences in 
cost-effectiveness between charities, that is, differences in the average amount 
of good done per dollar donated to charities. It has been claimed, for example, 
that $40,000 can be used either to help one person (by training a guide dog) or 
instead to help over one thousand people to at least as great an extent each (by 
providing surgeries reversing the effects of trachoma).2 At least if other things 
were equal, Effective Altruists would encourage you to use your money to do 
the latter rather than the former, on the ground that this would do much more 
good. Similar remarks apply to donations of time and expenditures of effort. 
Their central recommendation is to use resources put to altruistic purposes, so 
as to do the most good with them, without violating any side constraints there 
might be.3
This paper will begin by outlining the normative constituents of the mini-
mal philosophical view underpinning this central recommendation of Effec-
tive Altruism. We have aimed at finding a view that (1) is sufficient to justify the 
central Effective Altruist recommendation, (2) is independently philosophi-
cally plausible, and (3) is philosophically minimal, so as to fit with the widest 
range of respectable ethical traditions. We claim not that all Effective Altruists 
would accept this minimal view, but that many and perhaps most would. We 
also take our direct target to be the justification of Effective Altruism’s central 
recommendation, rather than of the Effective Altruism movement or partici-
pation in it. The minimal view would justify the latter indirectly, given certain 
plausible assumptions. For all we argue here, these assumptions (plausible as 
they are) may fail to hold, and many activities characteristic of participation in 
the Effective Altruism movement – donating to certain charities and encour-
aging others to do likewise, publicly discussing how to do the most good with 
one’s career, providing cost-effectiveness information to others, etc. – may in 
fact not be the best ways to help others. For example, Effective Altruists would 
recommend not sharing cost-effectiveness information with others if doing so 
counterproductively led people to decide in even less cost-effective ways than 
they otherwise would have done.
Once we have outlined the minimal view underpinning Effective Altru-
ism, we will then turn to our main claim, that there is an analogous minimal 
1 Singer 2015; MacAskill 2015.
2 Ord 2013.
3 See MacAskill 2019 on the definition of Effective Altruism.
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philosophical view which might underpin Effective Justice, a social movement 
that would encourage promoting justice most effectively, given limited re-
sources. The latter minimal view reflects an insight about justice, and our non-
diminishing reason to promote more of it, that surprisingly has gone largely 
unnoticed and undiscussed. The Effective Altruism movement has led many 
to reconsider how best to help others, but relatively little attention has been 
paid to the differences in degrees of cost-effectiveness of activities designed 
to decrease injustice or promote justice. This paper therefore has potentially 
major practical implications.
2 Effective Altruism
What, then, is the minimal philosophical view underpinning Effective Altru-
ism? Clearly, Effective Altruism involves the combination of “altruism” with 
“effectiveness.” We take it that benefiting others is the sense of “doing good” 
picked out by Effective Altruism, given the actual practices of Effective Altru-
ists and given that benefiting others is what altruism concerns.4 Presumably, 
you have at least some reason to benefit at least certain other individuals, at 
least when other things are equal.5 According to what we call Impartial Altru-
ism, you have a reason to benefit all others, regardless of factors like their gen-
der, race, and so forth, and regardless of any special relations to you.
Turn now to effectiveness. According to Maximizing Altruism, among those 
others you have reason to benefit, you have more reason to benefit them more, 
and most reason to benefit them as much as possible, other things being equal. 
This view applies to beneficence at any level. For example, a parent choos-
ing among various equally costly presents for her child has more reason, other 
things being equal, to choose those that benefit her child more, and most rea-
son to choose one that benefits her child most. But clearly, for Effective Altru-
ists, effectiveness does not end at home. They apply effectiveness to altruism 
in an impartial sense.
According to Impartial Altruism and Maximizing Altruism taken together, 
you have a reason to benefit all others, more reason to benefit them more, and 
most reason to benefit them as much as possible, other things being equal. 
We also need to add an assumption of practical relevance, according to which 
4 Doing good in this sense is thus something that could be endorsed by skeptics of “the good, 
simpliciter” such as Foot (1983) and Thomson (2008).
5 This final phrase, which we shall henceforth tend to omit, is to allow for the possibility that 
certain considerations, such as a potential beneficiary’s deserving to suffer, may cancel or 
“silence” the reason to benefit.
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the reason to benefit others impartially at least sometimes outweighs all other 
reasons, determining what there is most reason to do, all things considered. 
Since Impartial Altruism, Maximizing Altruism, and this assumption of practi-
cal relevance are together (1) sufficient to justify the central Effective Altruist 
recommendation, (2) independently philosophically plausible, and (3) philo-
sophically minimal, we believe their conjunction provides the minimal philo-
sophical view underpinning Effective Altruism. We do not hold that this view 
is so minimal that no one could object to it. A rational egoist, for example, may 
deny any other-regarding reasons, whether partial or impartial, while someone 
who accepts the possibility of impartial reasons of beneficence might main-
tain that they are in every case overridden by other, partial reasons. But we 
believe that many people, having properly grasped the view, would accept it.
The minimal nature of Effective Altruism’s philosophical underpinning is 
important to observe in the context of contemporary debate, since several 
commentators have raised objections to Effective Altruism as if it implied con-
sequentialism.6 It is true that many heavily involved in the Effective Altruism 
movement are consequentialists. But the combination of Impartial Altruism 
and Maximizing Altruism, along with the assumption of practical relevance, 
is clearly compatible with non-consequentialist moral options, moral con-
straints, rights, and agent-relative reasons.7 This minimal view can be seen as 
a version of the sort of principle of impartial beneficence accepted by non-
consequentialist pluralists such as W.D. Ross.8 In a Rossian spirit, we shall now 
suggest that there is a reason to promote justice as well as a reason to promote 
well-being.
3 Effective Justice
According to what we call Impartial Justice, you have a reason to promote jus-
tice which extends to all individuals, regardless of factors like their gender, 
race, and so forth, and regardless of any special relations to you. And according 
to Maximizing Justice, among those your reason to promote justice extends to, 
6 For example, see Gray (2015), Tumber (2015), Krishna (2016) and Fraser (2017).
7 While seemingly allowing that Effective Altruism is not very demanding (allowing for moral 
options), MacAskill says that giving to less effective charities on the basis of special personal 
connections would be “arbitrary” and “unfair” (2015, pp. 24–5). Whether or not MacAskill is 
correct, it is important to note that the minimal philosophical view underpinning Effective 
Altruism is consistent with the view that these connections can provide a direct justification 
for engagement in suboptimal altruism.
8 Ross (1930/2002, pp. 17–21) and Ross (1939, p. 271).
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there is more reason to promote more justice, and most reason to promote 
as much justice as possible, other things being equal. We suggest that, just as 
the combination of Impartial Altruism with Maximizing Altruism, along with 
an assumption of practical relevance, provides the minimal philosophical un-
derpinning for Effective Altruism, the combination of Impartial Justice with 
Maximizing Justice may serve to underpin Effective Justice, a social movement 
encouraging the maximally effective promotion of impartial justice, given lim-
ited resources.
Neither Impartial Justice nor Maximizing Justice implies that all justice-
based reasons have the same status or significance. Plausibly, reasons to avoid 
committing injustice tend to yield rightly enforceable duties of justice to 
avoid  so acting. Perhaps, while one has such a stringent duty of justice not 
to steal purses, one does not have a similarly stringent duty of justice to pre-
vent others from stealing purses. Such agent-relativity need not be unique to 
justice. Perhaps, while it is morally important to be the one who actually saves 
a drowning child, it is not similarly important to allow others to help. Never-
theless, Effective Justice and its proposed underpinning presuppose that jus-
tice can be promoted, which may seem in itself quite odd. How, and in what 
sense, could justice appropriately be promoted?
As ordinarily understood, justice and injustice may be properties of acts, 
agents, institutions, societies, or states of affairs; in each case, (in)justice can 
vary in degree. Given this plurality of bearers of justice, and the plurality of 
relations in which an agent could stand to these bearers and to the justice 
they bear, there are many potential sources of reasons to promote justice. The 
following four examples serve to illustrate and differentiate at least some of 
them.
Your Unjust Acts. You can commit fewer and smaller injustices or instead 
commit more and larger injustices. Suppose, for example, that you could 
expropriate oil from two people each of whom has a weak claim to it, or 
instead expropriate oil from ten others each of whom has a strong claim 
to it. Or suppose, as another example, that you can break moderately seri-
ous promises to two people, or instead break very serious promises to ten 
others. All other things are equal (that is, overall benefits are tied whether 
you commit fewer and smaller injustices or instead commit more and 
larger injustices, everyone involved is a stranger to you, and so on).9
9 We appreciate that more and larger injustices tend in practice to go hand in hand with more 
and larger losses of well-being, but are here supposing your two alternatives are tied with 
respect to overall benefits.
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Another’s Unjust Acts. Donald is credibly threatening to commit fewer 
and smaller injustices as well as more and larger injustices. (We trust the 
reader will have no difficulty filling in the relevant details for the sake 
of concreteness.) You can prevent Donald from committing fewer and 
smaller injustices or instead prevent him from committing more and 
larger injustices. All other things are equal.
Unjust Institutions. The institutions within a particular Western nation 
are credibly threatening to encourage further gender discrimination in 
promotion processes for top business executives as well as deny women 
any legal right to freedom of speech. You can prevent the occurrence of 
one but not both of these ways in which the nation’s institutions would 
otherwise become less just. All other things are equal.
Unjust Distributions. The world contains many people who are very bad-
ly off, much worse off than others, through no fault or choice of their 
own. Making those who are very badly off better off would, we might 
suppose, make the world less unjust. Suppose you can benefit 1 billion 
people. Each would receive a significant, same-sized benefit. You have 
a choice between benefiting 1 billion of the world’s worst-off people or 
instead 600 million of the world’s second-worst-off people alongside 400 
million of the world’s second-best-off people. All other things are equal.
Consider first Your Unjust Acts. If you choose the less unjust course of action, 
to that extent you will promote justice. If there are any justice-based reasons, 
then there are reasons to promote justice as a property of one’s own acts.10
The injustice in Another’s Unjust Acts is again a property of acts, which 
can be instantiated to a greater or lesser degree. It is plausible that you have a 
justice- based reason here to prevent Donald from committing more and larger 
injustices. This claim is admittedly more controversial than the claim made 
above, that any agent has a reason to promote justice in her own actions.11 But 
on the face of it it is not clear why, if justice (considered independently from 
well-being) provides a reason for an agent to act in one way rather than an-
other in the case of her own actions, it should not provide some such  reason 
10 Also see Markosian’s 2009 defense of Rossian minimalism, according to which “[a]n act is 
morally right iff it minimizes prima facie duty violations by its agent” (p. 7).
11 Indeed, some have argued that you do not have reason to prevent others from acting 
wrongly, on top of the reason you do have to prevent the bad effects of their wrongdoing 
(e.g., McMahan 2002, pp. 239–240; Scanlon 1998, p. 83; Frick 2016, pp. 258–9).
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in the case of the actions of others that the agent can influence. As David 
Wiggins says, in enlarging upon Justinian’s conception of the virtue of justice: 
“[J]ustness … comprises not only a certain kind of conscientiousness in acts of 
one’s own but also a concern for that which just acts are carried out for, and a 
measure of preoccupation too with the doings of other agents.”12
In Unjust Institutions, the kinds of injustice in question can be understood 
not only as properties of the actions of those involved, but as properties of in-
stitutions, of the basic structures of societies, or of societies themselves. Again 
it seems plausible to claim that one can promote justice in institutions by en-
suring that those institutions are more just, or less unjust, than they would 
otherwise be.
It is fairly uncontroversial among those who accept justice-based reasons 
that you have reason to promote the justice of your nation or society, or of their 
institutions. It is more controversial whether you have justice-based reasons to 
promote the justice of other nations’ or societies’ institutions. However, some 
argue that, in virtue of your role in your society, and your society’s doings, you 
do have justice-based reasons to promote the justice of other nations’ institu-
tions.13 Some non-cosmopolitans appear to believe that you have justice-based 
reasons to promote the justice of societies other than your own.14 Other theo-
rists argue for a cosmopolitan picture according to which, morally, we all be-
long essentially to the same society, and so the distinction drawn between your 
society and others cannot carry much, if any, moral weight.15 It is worth noting 
here that structurally similar positions can be constructed as far as altruism or 
beneficence are concerned. For example, many believe that we have special 
obligations to assist our fellow citizens. But again it is important to recognize 
that this belief is consistent with accepting an impartial principle of benefi-
cence which may in certain cases have greater practical weight than the partial 
principle (for example, when the benefit one can provide to fellow citizens is 
significantly smaller than that to non-citizens).
In Unjust Distributions, injustice can be seen as a property of a state of af-
fairs or outcome. This property is again a matter of degree, and so one form of 
promoting justice lies in bringing it about that this property is less instanti-
ated in the world than it would otherwise be. There is some controversy over 
12 Wiggins (2004, p. 488).
13 For example, see Miller (2007) and Ashford (2018).
14 Rawls claims that what he calls the “fundamental natural duty” of justice (which presum-
ably has pro tanto status) is “owed to persons generally” and includes the requirement “to 
further just arrangements not yet established” (1971/1999, p. 99).
15 Brock (2013).
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whether “purely distributive” reasons are genuinely justice-based reasons,16 
but it is fairly uncontroversial that there are some such purely distributive rea-
sons, whether they are classed as justice-based or not.17
These four typologies illustrate a range of ways in which one can promote 
justice. They also show how our claim that justice can be promoted is not 
equivalent to the controversial claim that justice should be understood en-
tirely in terms of the impersonal value of states of affairs. While proponents of 
Effective Justice may consistently claim that justice – construed as a property 
of states of affairs – has impersonal value, they need not claim this.18
Perhaps the main philosophical hurdle to seeing the force of Impartial Jus-
tice and Maximizing Justice (and consequently, with the assumption of prac-
tical relevance, Effective Justice) is a failure to accept that justice can be pro-
moted, or that it is the sort of thing the appropriate response to which can be 
promotion. Justice is often contrasted with things the appropriate response to 
which is promotion.19 For example, one might claim that justice requires that 
I treat you with respect, even if this has the result that respect for persons in 
general is not promoted.20 In fact, it would seem implausible if, while justice 
requires I treat you with respect, it were completely silent on how much reason 
I have to treat you with more or less disrespect. But even if justice truly does 
contrast with things the appropriate response to which is always promotion, 
this does not mean that justice is the sort of thing that it is never appropriate to 
promote. Even if there are spheres of justice in which the notion of promotion 
has no place, our four examples above show that there are several vitally impor-
tant spheres in which justice can be promoted, and, plausibly, appropriately so.
It might be suggested that, if there are things other than justice to which 
promotion is never the appropriate response, an account of the appropriate-
ness in question would jeopardize our claim that justice is, at least sometimes, 
to be promoted. Consider, for example, the beauty of some great painting, an 
appropriate response to which is admiration, or awe. We might reiterate our 
claim that promotion can be found a place here. You might, for example, be 
able to “promote” the continued existence of the painting and, hence, its beau-
ty. But there is no need for us to insist on this. In our examples above, justice 
16 Feldman (2016).
17 See Parfit (1991) and Temkin (2000) on equality and priority.
18 Proponents of Effective Altruism can also speak of impersonal value (value the bearer 
of which is not a sentient being) but may thereby be more open to a charge of double-
counting value if impersonal value is claimed to add value to that instantiated in the 
value of well-being (value the bearers of which are sentient beings).
19 There are exceptions. Consider, for example, Sen (1982) and Estlund (2016).
20 E.g., Pettit (1989 p. 121).
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can straightforwardly be promoted, and, plausibly, appropriately so. If there are 
things to which promotion is never the appropriate response (beauty, perhaps), 
so be it. Justice would then in a sense lie in between these things, and those to 
which promotion is always the appropriate response (pleasure, perhaps).
Note also that we are not claiming that there is no logical or conceptual 
space to deny our claims about the promotion of justice. A theorist of justice 
may wish to avoid all talk of promotion altogether, and even deny the compar-
ative claims we have made about the justice and injustice of different courses 
of action. Consider, for example, our claim that, given a choice between greatly 
disrespecting another person and disrespecting them to a lesser degree, you 
should choose the latter option, and so promote justice. An opponent may sug-
gest, in line with certain Stoic arguments, that both options are wrong, and 
neither is to be given any priority over the other.
Many people clearly accept something like Maximizing Altruism in at least 
certain spheres: they will buy their children the birthday presents that will 
please them most, for example. Further, many people accept that they have 
certain reasons to benefit those with whom they have weaker connections, 
such as others in their community. They may, for example, donate food to their 
local food bank. One upshot of the Effective Altruism movement has been an 
increase in the number of people who believe that they have a reason to pro-
mote well-being impartially, whether or not this is at the cost of any partial 
promotion of well-being in which they have been engaged. We might expect 
the same to happen with an Effective Justice movement, as people lift their 
eyes from the injustices closer or more salient to them and contemplate poten-
tially much greater injustices at a distance.
4 An Analogy among Disanalogies
One might accept that justice can appropriately be promoted, but nonetheless 
be left wondering about the purported analogy between Effective Altruism 
and Effective Justice. What is so special about this analogy? After all, for any X 
that can appropriately be promoted in some impartial way, one can presum-
ably defend an analogous combination of Impartial X with Maximizing X to 
yield the minimal philosophical underpinning of possible social movement 
Effective X.21 There are at least two special features of Effective Altruism and 
21 For any such movement to be justified, recall that certain assumptions about its effective-
ness have to be true.
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Effective Justice that make the analogy between them particularly worthy of 
attention.
The first is that the sorts of reasons they concern are morally serious ones. 
Reasons to benefit others and reasons to promote justice seem the sorts of 
things that have a significant normative pull on all agents, regardless of their 
desires or projects, and that may, in the absence of defeaters, give rise to obli-
gations. If there are reasons to promote things like beauty, they are at least not 
as plausibly morally serious in these ways. One may object that, if reasons to 
benefit others and promote justice are so morally serious that they defeasibly 
give rise to obligations, we will all too frequently be (defeasibly) obligated to 
put our money, time, and other resources toward these ends. But it is compat-
ible with everything we say here that we have significant moral latitude to use 
what is rightfully ours as we please, which constrains the space within which 
even defeasible obligations to benefit others or promote justice can arise.22
The second special feature is that, for some things that can appropriately be 
promoted, there is arguably a sufficiency threshold beyond which there is no 
further reason to promote them, or where the reason for promotion diminish-
es out of proportion to the amount of the item in question. Consider, for exam-
ple, species diversity, or human achievement.23 Perhaps ten thousand species 
is enough; maybe once one has won two Nobel prizes, the reason to accumu-
late more drops dramatically. There may be such things, but justice – at least 
in the spheres illustrated by our examples – is not one of them. The reason to 
promote justice does not diminish at any point, holding fixed the amount of 
justice promoted. If justice were promoted to such an extent that we found 
ourselves in a world of only very minor injustice, our reason to promote jus-
tice would be much weaker than it is now, but only because the  promotable 
amounts would be much smaller. Similarly, the reason to benefit others does 
not diminish at any point, holding fixed the size of benefit conferred (and 
holding fixed features of beneficiaries that might modify the reason to ben-
efit them, such as how well off or deserving they are). That there is such non-
diminishing reason to benefit others and to promote justice importantly sets 
Effective Altruism and Effective Justice apart from other projects, with more 
easily exhaustible normative pulls.
We have argued that there is an important structural analogy between the 
minimal philosophical underpinnings of Effective Altruism on the one hand, 
and Effective Justice on the other. But we must recognize that the examples we 
22 See Woollard (2015) (Ch. 7 and Ch. 8) and Woollard (2018) for discussion.
23 E.g., Lenman (2002) and Hurka (1983).
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have presented also illustrate certain readily apparent potential disanalogies 
between benefiting others and promoting justice. Here are six.
First, although both justice and beneficence, impartially construed, may be 
fully satisfiable (that is, there may be a world in which no further improve-
ment in terms of either justice or beneficence is possible), promoting justice 
impartially can plausibly be thought of as a matter of reducing or preventing 
injustice, while promoting the good of others involves reducing harm and in-
creasing benefit. But since decreasing injustice can be described as promoting 
justice, any disanalogy here does not seem to undermine the analogy we have 
defended.
Second, while there are several competing conceptions of well-being, there 
is more or less a single concept of it. On the other hand, there are multiple 
different concepts of justice each with its own cluster of competing concep-
tions.24 Perhaps Your Unjust Acts and Another’s Unjust Acts are about one sense 
of justice, Unjust Institutions is about another, Unjust Distributions is about yet 
another, and these different senses of justice cannot be reduced to a single 
fundamental notion of justice. And perhaps these different senses of justice 
correspond to different bearers of justice (whereas acts, agents, institutions, 
and states of affairs are different types of bearers of justice, plausibly sentient 
individuals are the only type of bearer of well-being). Acts aimed at promoting 
justice almost always have mixed effects – improving justice in one respect but 
decreasing it in another. Giving money to charity, for example, may promote 
distributional justice at the price of promoting institutional injustice (by re-
inforcing capitalism, for instance). Would this promote justice all things con-
sidered? This would be an ill-formed question if distributional justice and in-
stitutional justice were fundamentally distinct senses of justice – there would 
be no single “covering consideration” of justice.25 On this picture, Maximizing 
Justice would likewise be ill-formed, and would need to be replaced with Max-
imizing Justice1, Maximizing Justice2, Maximizing Justice3, etc., one for each 
fundamentally distinct sense of justice there is. Thus, while Effective Altruism 
aims to promote well-being, there may be no single thing Effective Justice aims 
to promote. Indeed, there may be no single Effective Justice but a plurality – 
one for each sense of justice. If this is correct, it would mark a significant dis-
analogy with Effective Altruism, but the structural analogy concerning reasons 
to promote and effectiveness would remain intact. A further related issue is 
whether there can be any intelligible comparisons of reasons to promote jus-
tice across these different senses or spheres of justice. Suppose an act has the 
24 See Rawls (1971,1999, p. 5) for a seminal invocation of the concept/conception distinction.
25 See Chang (2015).
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mixed effect of improving justice in one sense but decreasing it in another. 
Even if there were no answer to the question of whether it promoted justice 
all things considered, perhaps we could nonetheless intelligibly ask what we 
have most reason to do all things considered (as it seems we can when moral 
reasons and prudential reasons pull in opposite directions). Our aim here is 
not to resolve these issues, but merely to raise them.
Third, it may be thought that the degree of disagreement over the correct 
theory of justice undermines the practical significance of Effective Justice (rel-
ative to some particular sense, or concept, of justice). But there is also signifi-
cant disagreement over the correct theory of well-being: does some item ad-
vance one’s well-being, for example, because it is pleasant, because it fulfills or 
would fulfill certain desires, or because it is good independently of any mental 
states? This disagreement at the explanatory level contrasts with much agree-
ment at the substantive level. Almost all agree that losing one’s sight through 
some painful disease is bad even if they disagree about what it is in virtue of 
which it is bad. The same contrast is found in the case of justice. Many agree, 
for example, that it is unjust of a billionaire not to pay his taxes. Many also 
agree that it is unjust that billions of people in the world do so much worse 
than others in terms of nutrition, education, and health. In both cases, there 
is significant disagreement about how to characterize these injustices at the 
theoretical level, i.e., about what makes the act or state of affairs in question 
unjust.26
Fourth, proponents of Effective Justice may be concerned not – or not 
only – with the individuals who suffer injustice in absolute terms, but with the 
relations between them, such as inequality, and this may well turn out to be 
yet another disanalogy between Effective Justice and Effective Altruism. But 
again proportionality comes into play in a way that can render promotion ap-
propriate: acts and institutions can treat people more or less unequally, states 
of affairs can contain more or less inequality.27 The corresponding reasons to 
promote justice vary in strength accordingly.
26 Our examples and claims here have tended to presuppose broadly liberal conceptions 
of justice, but what about people who accept racist, sexist, or homophobic conceptions of 
justice? Are we claiming that they have most reason, or a duty, to promote justice as they 
conceive of it? Note that the same problem arises for Effective Altruism, as some people 
advocate morally objectionable conceptions of well-being. Indeed this is nothing more 
than the old problem of whether someone who advocates acting virtuously is recom-
mending that agents follow their consciences even when their moral views are false. 
Given the generality of that problem in ethics, we shall not seek to provide a solution in 
this paper.
27 See Temkin (1993) and Kagan (2014).
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Fifth, Effective Justice may be backward-looking in a respect that Effective 
Altruism is not. Altruism is usually understood as forward-looking in that it 
is concerned with enabling others to do better in the future than they might 
have done. The very idea of promotion is in itself forward-looking, but promot-
ing justice may well indispensably involve taking into account past wrongs – 
 including those in which we ourselves may be implicated – by individuals or 
groups, and seeking through compensation or other means to rectify them as 
far as possible, as well as to minimize such wrongs in the future.
Sixth, some have raised the concern that, insofar as the philosophical un-
derpinning of Effective Altruism is concerned solely with how you can most 
benefit others, it tacitly assumes an overly narrow form of moral individualism 
according to which, as Amia Srinivasan puts it, “the individual, not the commu-
nity, class or state, is the proper object of moral theorizing.”28 One might claim 
that this concern is even more pressing in the context of promoting justice, 
particularly that of communities, states, institutions, etc. To meet this concern, 
the underpinnings of both Effective Altruism and Effective Justice alike can be 
given a collectivist construal, so that they respectively pertain to the reasons 
we together have to benefit others and promote justice.29 However, there re-
mains a potentially major complication concerning harmony between the in-
dividual and collective levels that arises in connection with the accumulation 
of justice over multiple separate instances of promoting (in)justice. Suppose, 
for example, that act1 (inflicting a harm of -10 on child A to achieve a benefit of 
+20 for child B) promotes injustice, act2 (inflicting a harm of -10 on child B to 
achieve a benefit of +20 for child A) promotes injustice, but [act1 & act2] pro-
motes justice. Such non-accumulation of injustice over these individual acts 
could threaten the harmony between the individual and collective levels of 
Effective Justice (with the collective level favoring acts the individual level for-
bids or vice versa). On the other hand, insofar as well-being accumulates over 
multiple separate instances of promoting well-being, the analogous challenge 
could not arise for Effective Altruism.30 What should an Effective Justicist say? 
One option is to look for a way to harmonize the levels. For instance, in many 
cases, individual acts of promoting (in)justice are not parts of a mere collec-
tion, but are unified by some overarching plan, whether of a single agent or of 
a group of cooperating agents. Such unity could turn what would otherwise 
be individual acts of promoting injustice into individual acts of promoting 
28 Srinivasan (2015). Also see Ashford (2018), Dietz (2019), and Collins (2019).
29 Further, we need not rule out the possibility that certain institutions have reasons to pro-
mote impartial justice analogous to those of individual agents.
30 For further discussion, see Clark and Pummer (2019) and Temkin (2019).
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 justice. Such a solution is limited insofar as a collection of acts not so unified 
could nonetheless be said to promote justice or injustice. Another option for 
the Effective Justicist is to treat these putative cases of disharmony between 
collective and individual levels in something like the way they could treat cas-
es of “mixed effects” (see above). We could distinguish between justice as a 
property of individual acts and justice as a property of a collection of acts, and 
argue that these refer to two fundamentally distinct senses of justice. We could 
then add that a collection of acts may well promote justice in the collective 
sense even if its members promote injustice in the individual sense. We could 
add also that injustice relative to some particular sense of justice does accumu-
late over separate instances of its promotion, perhaps depending on the sense 
in question. As before, our aim here is to recognize this sort of complication 
concerning Effective Justice rather than resolve it. Even if issues of levels and 
the accumulation of justice give rise to further disanalogies between Effective 
Justice and Effective Altruism, the key structural analogy concerning reasons 
to promote and effectiveness would remain intact.
5 Practical Implications
None of the above disanalogies seem to undermine the crucial structural anal-
ogy between the underpinnings of Effective Altruism and Effective Justice. 
And together with minimally plausible claims about what justice consists in, 
as well as plausible empirical claims, Effective Justice would have a variety of 
practical implications. Imagine, for example, that you have made the decision 
to promote justice in education, and have $60,000 to spend. You might use this 
to pay tuition fees at an élite university for a relatively poor American student 
who might otherwise be deterred from accepting a place; or you might donate 
the money to Oxfam, so they could build several schools facilitating access to 
education for hundreds of girls in the developing world.31 All other things are 
equal. The Effective Justicist will argue that, between these two alternatives 
and as far as justice is concerned, you have more reason to donate to Oxfam. 
Or consider gender inequality. Suppose you could donate to Fawcett, which 
campaigns for equality of pay between individuals in the U.K. (who are well 
off by global standards),32 or instead to an overseas charity such as Living 
Goods, which will, for $1,500, help a woman who is disadvantaged by global 
31 https://www.thelifeyoucansave.org/where-to-donate/oxfam.
32 http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/.
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standards to obtain a career as a Community Health Provider in Uganda.33 
These examples should not be taken to suggest that Effective Justice is merely 
a matter of donating. Remember that one can promote justice in one’s own 
acts (and hence character), and so it may be that Effective Justicists will decide 
to live in certain ways that involve focusing on engaged political action rather 
than donation to charities. Effective Justice, like Effective Altruism, should 
be seen as “means neutral,” and not as committed to any particular means to 
its end.
On many plausible conceptions of well-being and of justice, and given plau-
sible empirical claims, promoting more well-being by helping the world’s ex-
tremely poor people will reliably coincide with promoting more justice, and it 
is accordingly likely that particular global poverty fighting charities ranked as 
promoting the most well-being would also be ranked as promoting the most 
justice.34 Even if there is not perfect convergence, it is still very plausible that 
the activities and charities favored by Effective Justice will reliably promote a 
lot of well-being, as well as justice (relative to some particular sense of justice). 
There is thus an Effective Altruist case for Effective Justice.35
Many are motivated to give money and time out of a concern for justice 
rather than beneficence.36 Indeed, grassroots movements for social justice are 
plentiful. Just as Effective Altruism has had a wide transformative effect on 
beneficence-focused philanthropy, volunteerism, activism, and career selec-
tion, we believe that Effective Justice could have a similar effect on analogous 
justice-focused activities. We do not claim that the minimal philosophical 
views underpinning Effective Altruism and Effective Justice would be suffi-
cient on their own to guide action. For this they would have to be combined 
with further claims, some of them empirical and some of them  philosophical 
33 https://www.thelifeyoucansave.org/Where-to-Donate/Living-Goods.
34 If one accepts a version of Effective Altruism which identifies reducing non-human ani-
mal suffering or reducing existential risks as the highest priority, there may be less over-
lap between activities and charities most favored by Effective Altruism and those most 
favored by Effective Justice (it would depend in part on the extent to which animals and 
future individuals are within the scope of justice as well as beneficence).
35 In addition, considerations of moral trade (Ord 2015) as well as moral uncertainty (Sepielli 
2013; MacAskill and Ord 2018; Rosenthal 2018) may well strengthen the Effective Altruist 
case for Effective Justice.
36 Bekkers and Wiepking (2011). It may be that a greater proportion of those moved by jus-
tice will think that they have a duty to give or volunteer (and not that they are doing what 
is kind but “beyond the call of duty”), but plenty moved by beneficence think this too, 
including some Effective Altruists.
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( including claims about what well-being or justice consists in, and about the 
relative strength of competing reasons). But, at least when combined with 
some generally decent background beliefs and dispositions, we suspect that an 
appreciation of these minimal views will indeed help guide action.
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